Background
Epistemic contextualism was originally put forward as a response to a familiar skeptical Cartesian argument.
You think you know where you live, but how do you know you aren't a bodiless victim of an evil demon that has supplied you with false experiences and memories? And, if you are not in a * I am indebted to Jason Stanley for his comments on my contribution to a symposium on his book at the 2006 Pacific Division APA meeting in Portland and to Delia Graff Fara for her comments on these remarks. I have also been greatly influenced by the conception of semantics in Neale (forthcoming).
position to know you are not such a victim, how can you know where you live? Dretske's (1970) noncontextualist answer was that the skeptic's argument wrongly assumes that knowledge claims are closed under obvious logical entailment. When we say that Albert knows where he lives, we suppose Albert takes for granted that he is not the victim of an evil demon, but we don't suppose he knows he is not such a victim. Similarly, when Albert is at the zoo, he knows that he and his child are looking at a zebra, even though he does not know that what they seeing isn't a horse painted to look like a zebra. Albert's knowledge depends on the assumption that there is no funny business of that sort going on. He knows only if that assumption is correct even if he does not know the assumption is correct. 1 Stanley (2005, p. 18) , echoing many others, says about Dretske's response that its "most worrisome consequence is that it results in a straightforward failure of single-premise epistemic closure." I want to begin my own discussion by calling attention to something interesting about this reaction, namely, that the main point of Dretske's paper was precisely to argue against single-premise epistemic closure by appeal to intuitions about cases! Stanley's "worrisome consequence" is Dretske's intuitively plausible point in favor of his theory. DeRose's (1995) claim that it is particularly infelicitous to say such things as, "John knows that he has hands, but he does not know that he is not a handless brain in a vat." But such a remark seems quite OK to me (and to many others). When Stanley says of such examples, that Dretske's theory "has inexplicably bad consequences," it would be more appropriate to report a clash of "intuitions".
Stanley approvingly cites Keith

Epistemic Contextualism
In certain "ordinary" contexts people tend to allow that Albert knows where he lives, etc., while in skeptical philosophical contexts the same people are inclined not to allow such things. After those contexts have passed, however, people tend to go back to allowing what they were reluctant to allow in the skeptical philosophical contexts.
It also seems that whether speakers attribute knowledge to someone can depend on what is at stake. People seem to be more willing to allow that So understood, epistemic contextualism is a claim about speaker meaning or utterer's meaning (Grice 1957 (Grice , 1968 . Furthermore, it is a claim about what speakers or utterers or language users mean in the first instance to be saying rather than what they might mean to be implying in saying something else. It is a claim about primary speaker meaning.
Importantly, epistemic contextualism understood in this way is not directly a claim about the meanings of words or sentences, although one or another theorist might go on to try to explain the supposed differences in primary speaker meaning by appeal to something special about the meaning of the word know or other aspects of the meaning of sentences used to make knowledge attributions.
Stanley's Critique
As an alternative to epistemic contextualism, Stanley offers the plausible principle that whether S knows that P can depend on the importance to S not to have a false belief that P . Whether S knows that P can depend on whether S is justified in deciding that the grounds for accepting P are sufficient, which can depend on how important it is to S not to have a false belief that P . While I agree with Stanley's principle (Harman 1986 and 2004) 
Minimal Contextualism
Nevertheless, I think it might be possible to defend a minimalist contextualism that starts with the idea that what a person knows typically rests on things the person simply assumes or takes for granted without knowing them and without being in a position to know them. For example, a person typically takes for granted that the world is much as it seems and is not an illusion created by a Cartesian evil demon. A visitor to the zoo typically assumes that the animals displayed there have not been painted or otherwise disguised so as to look like other animals.
In this view, when others think about what people know, they too typically take for granted the same sorts of things. When they do so, they are perfectly willing to say such things as that Albert knows he lives in New Jersey and knows that the animal he is looking at is a zebra.
Minimal contextualism holds that in such a case neither what someone means in the first instance to say in saying that Albert knows he lives in New
Jersey nor what the audience takes him or her to mean in the first instance to be saying implies that Albert knows he is not a brain in a vat or other evil demon victim. Similarly, what someone means in the first instance to say in saying that Albert knows he is looking at a zebra does not imply, and would not be taken to imply, that he knows that it isn't a horse painted to look like a zebra. Those are things that a speaker and other participants in the conversation typically take Albert to assume without necessarily knowing to be the case, although conversational participants should not be expected to be able to express matters in exactly this way.
Furthermore, what the speaker means in the first instance to be saying in these contexts can be true even though Albert merely assumes and does not know that the relevant presuppositions are true. Standards of Precision? Lewis (1979) suggests that (what I am calling) minimal epistemic contextualism might be seen as an instance of variation in presupposed "standards of precision." For example, someone says that there is a vacuum in a certain container (e.g., in a vacuum tube). The truth of what the speaker means in the first instance to be saying depends on what standards the speaker presupposes. Given the strictest imaginable standards, perhaps there are no vacuums, because nothing is completely empty, using the strictest standards of emptiness. Given laxer standards, there is a vacuum in this particular tube.
Similarly perhaps, by lax standards, Albert knows he lives in New Jersey; by stricter standards he does not know this. What a speaker means in the first instance to be saying in saying that Albert knows he lives in New Jersey is true if the speaker is presupposing lax standards but not true if the speaker is presupposing stricter standards.
Objection: this is the sort of "loose use" involved in saying that France is hexagonal. It is not a literal use of language. It is intended to be recognized as an exaggeration. The speaker literally says something false but implies something more or less true. To take that as a model for epistemic contextualism is to accept Unger's (1975) skepticism. In that view, no one ever really knows anything, but we communicate something indirectly by saying people know things just as we communicate something about France in saying that it is hexagonal even though France is not really hexagonal.
Reply: Perhaps that is right about France not really being hexagonal, but without further argument the objection begs the question against this version of epistemic contextualism, which asserts that knowledge claims are not, and are not intended to be, understood as exaggerations. Epistemic contextualism is here understood as a claim about direct speaker meaning,
